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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MERGERS AND MONOPOLIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CYCLICAL EFFECT OF ANTI-COMPETITION AND A LACK OF
RATE REGULATION IN HEALTH CARE

ABSTRACT
Health care costs continue to rise, forcing consumers to make difficult
choices between seeking expensive treatment and risking the consequences
without. To combat the inflation of health care costs, the Affordable Care Act
implemented a number of policies aimed at improving the quality of care while
lowering the cost of that care. In order to accomplish the goals of the
Affordable Care Act, health care systems began merging with one another and
acquiring smaller groups to incorporate into a vast network of providers.
However, many of these mergers offer little value to consumers. Instead, they
ultimately drive up the cost of health care services, often with minimal
improvements in the quality of care. On the other side of the health care
spectrum, medical device manufacturers have managed to control lawmakers
through extensive lobbying efforts, eliminating competition from more
affordable alternatives and limiting regulations that could be beneficial for
consumers. Using a health system and a medical device case study to examine
such problems, this article demonstrates how anti-competitive behavior and a
lack of rate regulation negatively impact health care costs. It will also propose
solutions to resolve these problems so consumers can take back control of their
health care.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“What we have in the industry, in the provider market, is a hard-wired
market strategy to seek and exploit market power,” Barak Richman, Professor
of Law at Duke University 1
Competition laws have long been an issue of contention with hospital
mergers and acquisitions. More recently with the advancement of treatment
options, the medical technology field has also become rife with monopolistic
concerns. With the ever-increasing market goal of expansion, profitability, and
market-control in health care, antitrust issues are highly relevant today. 2
Contributing to the care provider side of this, the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
encourages hospitals, physician groups, and even insurers to create accountable
care organizations (ACOs) or similar coordinated care systems in the hope that
they will increase quality and access to health care while reducing costs for
all. 3 A pattern has emerged within the health care industry that suggests there
is a relationship between competition problems and rate regulations. Because
of the unique nature of health care, each level of provider contributes to the
rising costs of medical care through this relationship.
Health care provider groups often merge with each other to create larger
organizations for financial reasons, and most do not present competition
concerns for antitrust authorities. 4 However, mergers that do raise concerns are
typically handled federally by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the
United States (U.S.) Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division,
although state attorneys general are also able to investigate cases. 5 Often when
antitrust issues develop, the solution is a consent agreement between the
parties, wherein the competitive concern is eliminated, usually through
divestiture of an interest, and the agreement can continue. 6 Sometimes, the

1. Jay Hancock, Expert: Hospital’s ‘Humongous Monopoly’ Drives Prices High, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/expert-hospitals-humongous-mo
nopoly-drives-prices-high/.
2. See generally Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/
(warning that ACO’s “could lead to greater consolidation in the health care industry, which could
allow some providers to charge more”); see also Martin Gaynor, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Letter to the Editor, Health Law and Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at
A22, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/opinion/health-law-and-antitrust.html.
3. See generally Gold, supra note 2.
4. Guide to Antitrust Laws: Mergers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). Ninety-five
percent of mergers raise no competition concerns. Id.
5. Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, www.ftc.gov/tips-ad
vice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
6. See Guide to Antitrust Laws: Mergers, supra note 4.
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FTC or DOJ will bring the matter before a court to prevent the merger from
occurring in any form. 7
Historically, there were periods of time when companies were more
successful with freely merging, and others, like now, when the agencies are
more successful in controlling the parameters of mergers. 8 One of the greatest
differences between older cases and more recent cases is the effect the ACA
has had on the design of care systems. The goal of the ACA is to improve
access to affordable, quality health care, but also to encourage providers to be
more efficient and better utilize available funds and incentives. 9 The eventual
goal of the ACA is to reduce spending for consumers and the government, in
an attempt to substantially, yet gradually, lessen the national expenditures
associated with health care services. 10 Health care providers hope to fulfill the
ACA’s goals by joining together and implementing new policies to improve
patient quality and decrease provider spending. 11 However, as providers take
steps toward achieving the goals of the ACA, the methods used to achieve this
success often include reducing vital competition. The reduction of provider
competition has helped enable health care costs to soar well beyond that of
other developed nations, while offering few quality improvements compared to
those nations. 12

7. Id.
8. See Michael R. Bissegger, The Evanston Initial Decision: Is There a Future for Patient
Flow Analysis?, 39 J. HEALTH L. 143, 154 (2006). Most cases lost by the DOJ and FTC were due
to the agencies’ inability to demonstrate a relevant geographic market. Id. In the late 1980s and
1990s, these agencies began better defining a narrow geographic market area in antitrust disputes
and consequently were more successful in their actions against merging care groups. Id. This
created the rule of thumb for merger analysis as “narrow market, government wins; broad market,
government losses.” Id.
9. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
10. Deficit-Reducing Health Care Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov/econo
my/reform/deficit-reducing-health-care-reform (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
11. See Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., New hospitals and Health Care
Providers Join Successful, Cutting-edge Federal Initiative That Cuts Costs and Puts Patients at the
Center of Their Care (Jan. 11, 2016), www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/01/11/new-hospitals-andhealth-care-providers-join-successful-cutting-edge-federal-initiative.html (announcing 121 new
participants in Medicare ACOs).
12. Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price of a Highly Concentrated Health Care
Market, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/06/no-competi
tion-the-price-of-a-highly-concentrated-health-care-market/; Health Spending: Trends and
Impact, KAISER FAM. FOUND., slide 4 (Apr. 16, 2013), www.slideshare.net/KaiserFamilyFounda
tion/health-spending-trends-and-impact?redirected_from=save_on_embed; KAREN DAVIS ET AL.,
COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 26 (2014).
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Another factor influencing the exorbitance of health care costs is a lack of
substantial rate regulation in the American economy. 13 This concept of rate
regulation refers to the government’s ability to monitor and control rates in
various industries through the creation of regulations. 14 The regulatory issues
in health care are widely attributable to the political atmosphere that has
developed national policies over the past several decades. 15 This issue of rate
regulation, or lack thereof, is troubling for the American population as health
care expenses now make up around seventeen percent of the gross domestic
product, for a total expense of 2.9 trillion dollars for American consumers. 16
To understand the issues surrounding rate regulation, it is important to
understand the foundation of the health care payment system that has allowed
physicians, hospitals, and other health care organizations to transform the
health care industry into an extremely profitable field. It is also important to
understand the role secondary industry participants, like manufacturers of
medical devices, play in this payment scheme and the lack of effective rate
regulation. These two relatively different industries create a tale of two cities,
with each demonstrating separate paths for the rise and maintenance of market
power, yet with interwoven effects that ultimately yield the same result.
To put some of these issues in context, this article will examine the factors
that have created the inefficient health care market the U.S. has today. This
article will then examine and compare the competitive concerns of two health
care industries: the provider industry and the medical device industry. These
two industries utilize different approaches to maneuver through applicable
laws and regulations, but both have resulted in financial harm to consumers. In
performing this analysis, this article will scrutinize a contested settlement in
Massachusetts between Partners HealthCare System and the state attorney
general. This case analysis will demonstrate the antitrust issues and ultimate
costs that eventually fall to consumers when hospitals and other health care
organizations merge. This article will also discuss the drawbacks and benefits
to merging and consolidating services in relation to patient expenses. Further,

13. Noam Schimmel, Opinion, Regulating U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/regulating-us-health-care.html.
14. See State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-rate-approval-disapprov
al.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (providing an example of the government’s ability to monitor
and control rates in the health insurance industry through regulation of premiums).
15. See generally Timothy S. Jost, Eight Decades of Discouragement: The History of Health
Care Cost Containment in the USA, 15 FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 53 (2012).
16. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2013: Growth Slows, Remains In
Step For Overall Economy, 34 HEALTH AFF. 150, 150 (2015); see also National Health
Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., www.cms.gov/Re
search-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

MERGERS AND MONOPOLIES

301

it will demonstrate how the rising medical costs come full circle, beginning
with the manufacturing of the products all the way to the consumer’s pocket. It
will also investigate various proposals to reduce costs, though the effectiveness
of these proposals may vary. As consumers become more aware of the factors
that influence quality and cost of health care, there is hope that combined
pressure from a variety of sources will force providers and secondary health
care companies to lower prices, or, in the alternative, that this pressure will
lead to stricter rate regulations of the provider and medical device industries.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of health care demonstrates that Americans have tried many
approaches to create an affordable system with quality care. 17 But why is it
that Americans have been forced to do this time and time again? With each
new health system approach, prices have risen, but quality of care has not.
American consumers are constantly searching for the next best affordable
option to health care, yet they continue to pay more for it than any other
developed nation. 18 In the U.S., consumers spend almost twenty percent of
their gross domestic product on health care, which is double the amount spent
in most other developed nations. 19 Many researchers and economists highlight
this discrepancy, coupled with the fact that “the results [the American] health
care system produces are no better and often worse than the outcomes in those
[other developed] countries.” 20
As a whole, health care systems in America have become so powerful that
they “dominate the nation’s economy and put demands on taxpayers to a
degree unequaled anywhere else on earth.” 21 It is because of this that every
decade or so a new health care model evolves to curb the ever-growing
expenses of health care. 22 To demonstrate this, the Kaiser Family Foundation
graphed the cost of health care over the past fifty years and drew attention to
the rapid increases Americans have paid for their health care. 23 Each decade
has seen exponential growth in payments, as expenses double about every ten

17. See generally Michael Millenson, Analysis: ACOs Could Have The Medicare Muscle To
Transform Health System, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 2, 2012), khn.org/news/millenson-acosmuscle-to-transform-system/.
18. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 12.
19. Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills are Killing Us, TIME (2013),
http://www.uta.edu/faculty/story/2311/Misc/2013,2,26,MedicalCostsDemandAndGreed.pdf.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Millenson, supra note 17.
23. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 12, at slide 1.
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years. 24 This trajectory is not sustainable for the American consumers whose
income has not inflated as quickly as their medical expenses have. 25
A.

Health Care Providers

Throughout the past few decades, the health care industry has seen many
payment system reforms in attempts to control rising costs and improve
deficient care. These payment reforms signified the beginning of the managed
care era of organizations. 26 In the 1980s, Congress passed legislation that
dramatically altered hospital payments for Medicare services. 27 This renewed
plan was a “prospective payment system” in which Medicare paid predetermined flat rates for services based on a patient’s diagnosis. 28 That system
eliminated the “cost plus” system previously utilized, wherein hospitals were
guaranteed a profit margin. 29 While ideally the set-fee payment system saved
Medicare from overspending, in reality, it often resulted in reduced care
quality for patients. 30 For instance, because hospitals no longer received
payment for extended patient stays in hospitals or additional tests conducted,
patients were released sooner than medically necessary in some cases—a
problem which became known as the “quicker and sicker” issue. 31 Determined
to find ways around this flat-payment schedule, hospitals began transferring
patients to other managed care settings like outpatient centers, where the
prospective payment system did not apply. 32
Following the Medicare overhaul of the 1980s, health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) and other private insurers flourished in the 1990s by
offering fixed payments for services in an effort to control wasteful spending
by health care organizations. 33 This plan was not without its faults though;
hospitals went to extremes to cut patient costs in an effort not to lose money
themselves. 34 Trial and error of payment systems has resulted in some success
and some failure, leaving legislators, health care organizations, and insurers
confused on how best to manage costs and care.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
See id. at slide 15.
Jost, supra note 15, at 58, 60-70.
Millenson, supra note 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Millenson, supra note 17.
Id.
Id.
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A health care organization is at its heart a business; its goal is to maintain
profitability while providing health care services, 35 an ironic, yet necessary
aspect of most any health care business. It is necessary because, without
profits, these organizations cannot perform their most basic function: care and
treatment. This is true regardless of tax status; organizations with non-profit,
tax-exempt status must make money to function, just as for-profit
organizations must. In fact, research suggests there may be little difference
between the amount of charitable care that results in lost profits provided by
non-profit care facilities and the amount provided by for-profit facilities. 36
Regardless, to create profitability, health care organizations need to have high
patient volume and reimbursements and low debt and spending. 37
One recent push from Congress to control health care spending and quality
comes from the ACA. Encouraged by the ACA, ACOs have become the latest
payment system introduced to curb costs and improve care. 38 These ACOs
offer benefits to patients and providers alike, which makes them ideal
compared to previous models. 39 However, initial projections and the latest data
reports show some potential concerns in whether they will ultimately garner a
great enough market share to create a substantial benefit. 40
To help increase involvement in ACOs, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) has enacted a variety of incentive programs to entice
care groups into the ACO structure. 41 These benefits include profit-sharing
without risk of loss-sharing when organizations do not exceed designated

35. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23
J. CORP. L. 741, 742, 744 (1998).
36. See also David Blumenthal & Nigel Edwards, The Tale of Two Systems: The Changing
Academic Health Center, 19 HEALTH AFF. 86, 86 (2000); Gabriel Picone et al., Are For-Profit
Hospital Conversions Harmful to Patients and to Medicare?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 507, 507 (2002).
See generally Hyman, supra note 35; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING
HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/health_care/
204694.pdf.
37. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 630 (West 7th ed. 2013) (nonprofits chapter).
38. Gold, supra note 2.
39. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/
aco (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
40. Fact Sheets: Medicare ACOs continue to succeed in improving care, lowering cost of
growth, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/News
room/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-09-16.html (noting that
only a small portion of Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs actually garnered
enough savings to share in them and many ACOs have dropped out of the program since
inception).
41. See Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), supra note 39; see also News and Updates,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-forService-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/News.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2015).
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benchmarks for the first three years of inception. 42 By utilizing a gradual entry
into the ACO cost-sharing program, care organizations are given time to
acclimate to structural changes required of an ACO so they can become
profitable with considerably less risk. 43 If organizations are unable to reach
enough benchmarks to share in savings, they may drop out of the incentive
program altogether, opting for a non-ACO model instead. 44 As such, there is
an incentive for the government to structure the ACO benefits to be more
attainable, which is why CMS has solicited suggestions and created a variety
of ACO models to make the program more beneficial for all. 45
The problem ACOs and many other CMS initiatives are designed to fix is
the popular fee-for-service model of payments for physician services. The feefor-service model is one in which a physician receives a payment for each
individual service performed, as opposed to a bundled payment model, which
would bundle a group of services together for a set fee. 46 Fee-for-service has
been the accepted method of payment in the U.S. for some time now, 47 but its
popularity does not mean it is the best payment system.
Like the prospective payer system and HMOs of the 1980s and 1990s, feefor-service can incentivize doctors to make medical decisions motivated by
profit. 48 However, unlike the previous models, which undercut quality by
potentially reducing services to fit a budget, fee-for-service encourages
excessive care from physicians. 49 By receiving a payment for each service
provided, physicians are incentivized to order as many tests as possible to
ensure the patient is well cared for, even if his wallet is not. 50 This system has
led to financial waste, as many services provided are not medically
necessary. 51 It has also allowed prices for equipment and services to sky-

42. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING
SHARED SAVINGS AND LOSSES UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 3, 6 (2014),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Down
loads/ACO_Methodology_Factsheet_ICN907405.pdf.
43. Id. at 2-3.
44. S. Lawrence Kocot et al., The Medicare Shared Savings Program: CMS Turns To
Stakeholders On Incentivizing ACO Risk, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2014/12/19/the-medicare-shared-savings-program-cms-turns-to-stakeholders-onincentivizing-aco-risk/.
45. Id.
46. Bundled Payments for Care Improvements Initiative Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/
Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-01-30-2.html.
47. See Julie Barnes, Moving Away From Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755/.
48. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: MOVING TOWARDS BUNDLED PAYMENT 1 (2013).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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rocket, giving all involved in the care of a patient—from device manufacturer
to physician—a piece of the profit margin. 52
Fee-for-service insurance coverage also exacerbated the problem of moral
hazard, which has contributed to the overuse and overcharging of health care
services. 53 The moral hazard concept points to the overuse of unnecessary
medical services because such services are available and covered. 54 The
American approach to health care is that more care equals better health;
however, this is not always true. 55
B.

Medical Device Industry

Medical devices have been part of the U.S. health care industry since the
civil war. 56 By the mid-1960s, the first regulations were enacted by then
President John F. Kennedy in an effort to prosecute companies for product
liability. 57 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the medical
device industry, 58 however, the power of the FDA in the 1960s was very
limited in regards to medical devices. 59 Throughout the next few decades, the
FDA’s ability to monitor and regulate the medical device industry grew. 60
While the government attempted to impose regulations on the field, the
companies producing the medical devices began to develop and grow more

52. See id.
53. See generally Patrick Bajari et al., Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Health
Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis, 45 RAND J. ECON. 747, 761 (2014).
54. Id. at 753, 761.
55. Eve Kerr & John Ayanian, How to Stop the Overconsumption of Health Care, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Dec. 11, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/how-to-stop-the-overconsumption-of-healthcare.
56. Michael MacRae, The Civil War and the Birth of the U.S. Prosthetics Industry, AM.
SOC’Y MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, www.asme.org/engineering-topics/articles/bioengineering/thecivil-war-and-birth-of-us-prosthetics-industry (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
57. Brief History of US Medical Device Regulation, EMERGO, http://visual.ly/brief-historyus-medical-device-regulation (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); see Significant Dates in U.S. Food and
Drug Law History, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2014).
58. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/de
fault.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2015).
59. Rodney R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical Devices Over the
Last Fifty Years, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 163, 164 (1995).
60. Id. at 168. See generally Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra
note 57.
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powerful as the technology advanced. 61 The most growth has occurred over the
last few decades, as have the rates charged for the products. 62
As far as regulations are concerned, the medical device industry has
protected itself from most regulation for years through its successful and
extensive lobbying efforts. 63 It has managed to garner support from both
Republican and Democratic members of Congress, particularly from those
members in whose states the manufacturers are found. 64 These lobbying efforts
are exemplified in the recent attempts to repeal the medical device tax that was
included in the ACA. 65
Part of what has enabled the medical device industry to grow so rapidly
and have such high profitability is the same moral hazard and American
overuse-of-health-care approach described in the health care industry section
above. This approach includes the idea that the most expensive option must be
the best option, thus encouraging the medical technology industry to
continually create new or modified drugs and devices, even when the results
are the same as the older, cheaper, less advanced products. 66 With each new
device that boasts some new benefit, a medical device company is potentially
able to reduce its competition and increase the price of the product.
III. GOVERNING LAWS AND AGENCIES
There are three federal laws of relevance to the health care antitrust
discussion: the Sherman Act, 67 the Clayton Act, 68 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino

61. The Medical Device Industry in the United States, SELECT USA, http://selectusa.com
merce.gov/industry-snapshots/medical-device-industry-united-states.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2016).
62. Id.; Snapshots: How Changes in Medical Technology Affect Health Care Costs, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-how-changes-inmedical-technology-affect/; INT’L TRADE ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICES INDUSTRY ASSESSMENT 3
(2010), http://ita.doc.gov/td/health/medical%20device%20industry%20assessment%20final%20ii
%203-24-10.pdf.
63. Medical Supplies: Lobbying, 2014, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., www.opensecrets.org/
industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2014&ind=H4100 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (demonstrating that
the total amount in dollars spent on lobbying by the medical device and supplies industry for
2014 was $33,322,243 on behalf of 108 companies).
64. Gregory W. Daniel, 5 Questions About the Medical Device Tax, and Its Potential for
Repeal, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/
11/12-medical-device-tax-daniel.
65. Daniel, supra note 64. For a greater discussion of the medical device tax and
congressional efforts to repeal it, see infra Part V.
66. See Merrill Goozner, High-Tech Medicine Contributes to High-Cost Health Care,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 15, 2010), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/ft-health-care-hightech-costs/.
67. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
68. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012).
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Antitrust Improvements Act. 69 Anti-competition laws have existed since the
original Sherman Act of 1890, which first codified a federal prohibition of
anti-competitive or monopolistic practices. 70 After the Sherman Act was
written, the Clayton Act further clarified that the government could prevent
and eliminate any business activities involving illegal tying contracts or
corporate mergers and acquisitions. 71 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act amended the
Clayton Act by mandating certain companies to file premerger notifications
with the FTC and the DOJ’s Antitrust Division if they planned to integrate. 72
These premerger notifications give the reviewing agencies time to analyze
mergers and determine whether they are fair to consumers. 73 In addition to
those laws, there are also state laws governing antitrust practices, and the FTC
has its own, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, which grants the
agency the power to reject or accept mergers, investigate potential cases,
prescribe trade regulation rules, and issue monetary redress against businesses
that violate these laws. 74 Beyond the scope of health care, the FTC and DOJ’s
Antitrust Division oversee all types of competition issues and utilize a
multitude of antitrust laws and regulations that have been created over the
years to govern each field. 75 The state attorneys general play a similar role in
monitoring, investigating, and prosecuting companies that exhibit anticompetitive practices to the degree that consumers are harmed. 76
IV. EFFECTS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
A.

Health Care Provider Case Study and Anti-Competitive Effects

To examine the effects of competition, or lack thereof, on health care
service rates, the Partners HealthCare system (Partners) and the recent antitrust
lawsuit associated with the system in Massachusetts make an excellent case
study. 77 Partners, a non-profit organization, was originally formed when two

69. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-15(h), 18(a), 66
(2012).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
73. Id.
74. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).
75. See Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Antitrust Enforcement and
the Consumer, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/antitrust-enfor-con
sumer.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
76. About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/naag/about_
naag.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
77. See Robert Weisman & Scott Allen, Partners Pays a Price After Bid for South Shore,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/08/partners-quest-for
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hospitals, Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Massachusetts General
Hospital, merged in 1994. 78 It now boasts an impressive list of “community
and specialty hospitals, a managed care organization, a physician network,
community health centers, home care[,] and other health-related entities.” 79 In
its twenty-one years since inception, Partners has accumulated forty-three
“members,” affiliated programs and centers, and collaborates with four
research and development (R&D) programs. 80 Clearly evident from the
numbers, Partners is a massive health care organization within the state of
Massachusetts. 81
In line with the ACA’s goals, Partners has rearranged itself as an ACO to
improve coordinated care for patients and promote cost savings. 82 As the
largest health care system in the state of Massachusetts, 83 Partners also holds
the majority market share of health care business in the Boston area.84
Recently, in 2012, Partners attempted two new acquisitions of South Shore
Hospital and Harbor Medical Associates, as one group, and Hallmark Health
System, which would further expand its market power to dominate other
provider systems in the northeastern area of Massachusetts. 85
There are benefits and drawbacks to such a large health care system. The
coordinated care aspect across the system and greater access to state-of-the-art

-south-shore-hospital-fueled-backlash-and-debate-over-how-big-too-big/XDPn96u1jqpM8X5GB
Z3n8H/story.html.
78. About Partners HealthCare, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, http://www.partners.org/About/
Default.aspx?id=1 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
79. Id.
80. Partners HealthCare Members and Affiliations, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE,
http://www.partners.org/About/Company-Information/Members.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
81. CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2014) [hereinafter CHIA REPORT]. According to a
report released in September 2014, in 2011, the most recent analysis performed by the Center for
Health Information and Analysis (CHIA), Partners HealthCare had accumulated twenty-eight
percent of the market share of hospital and physician payments. Id. Most notably, this number
was three times larger than the next largest provider system. The four largest providers accounted
for around fifty percent of the provider market. Id.
82. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (2013),
http://partnershealthcare.uberflip.com/i/307830/3.
83. HEALTH POLICY COMM’N, REVIEW OF PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM’S PROPOSED
ACQUISITION OF HALLMARK HEALTH CORP. 8 (2014) [hereinafter HPC HALLMARK REPORT];
see also CHIA REPORT, supra note 81, at accompanying text.
84. Weisman & Allen, supra note 77; HA T. TU ET AL., COMMUNITY REPORT: STATE
REFORM DOMINATES BOSTON HEALTH CARE MARKET DYNAMICS 4-5 (2010) (noting that the
prestige and brand name of Partners hospitals in the Boston area allow the hospitals to exercise
market leverage beyond what the market share suggests).
85. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 78.
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treatment and facilities are certainly beneficial to consumers. 86 However, with
that improved care comes the substantial risk of increased costs to consumers
because of the increase in market power, and, thus, the ability to demand
higher prices from insurers as well as establish higher fees for services. 87
Evidence suggests there is a direct relationship between the increase in
market power and the decrease in market competition, which results when
health organizations merge. 88 There is significant factual support that greater
market power and less competition result in greater costs to consumers. 89 A
2012 update to a 2006 survey confirmed the findings of two prominent health
and antitrust economists who found that hospital mergers do not typically yield
significant savings, and those that do generally do so only because they merged
operations completely. 90 These economists also found that while such mergers
generally raise prices significantly, they tend to lower the quality of care
offered, an alarming trend for consumers. 91 This survey is especially relevant
to the Partners discussion described herein because it focused on the effects of
a combination of horizontal and vertical acquisitions, both of which occur in
the Partners case. 92
In Partners’ latest acquisition attempt of Hallmark Health System, South
Shore Hospital, and Harbor Medical Associates, an investigation was
conducted by both the then Attorney General of Massachusetts, Martha

86. David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation,
310 [J]AMA 1964, 1967 (2013).
87. Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, Professor, H.
John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie) [hereinafter Statement of
Gaynor].
88. Id. at 6.
89. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 44; see also Statement of Gaynor, supra
note 87, at accompanying text; Cutler & Morton, supra note 86, at accompanying text; CHIA
REPORT, supra note 81, at 14. In a comparison of the physician groups’ total medical
expenditures (TME), the four largest all reported expenditures higher than the designated +3.6%
benchmark in the major payor networks. Id. Partners Community HealthCare, Inc. (PCHI), a
member of the Partners HealthCare System, was the only group to report that its expenditures
were higher than the network average and TME that had increased across all payors. Id.
90. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT J. TOWN, HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION
AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE?, RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 9
10 (2006); Brief for Leemore Dafny et al. as Amici Curiae at 4, Commonwealth of Mass. v.
Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. July 21, 2014) [hereinafter
Dafny et al.].
91. MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, SYNTHESIS PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION-UPDATE 1, 3 (2012).
92. Id.
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Coakley, and the DOJ. 93 After conducting her investigation, the Attorney
General came to an unexpected solution. Instead of rejecting the merger as
some anticipated, Coakley offered a settlement option to Partners, wherein the
merger would be accepted with conditions that extended through the next five
to ten years. 94
This proposed settlement was so unexpected that over 170 organizations
submitted a brief to the court in favor of or against it. 95 As a result, the
settlement was amended to include a few more restrictions, 96 although the
judge’s approval was still required before the merger could continue. The final
proposed settlement would allow Partners to acquire the desired hospitals and
systems with the following stipulations: payors could split Partners into
separate contracting entities for up to ten years; Partners would be prevented
from contracting with affiliate physician groups not already within its own
hospitals for ten years; health costs would be capped at the rate of inflation
across the entire Partners network through 2020; physicians’ growth would be
capped for five years; and additional Partners hospital expansion in eastern
Massachusetts would be blocked for the next seven years. 97 Furthermore, a
monitor would be appointed by the Attorney General’s office and would be
paid for by Partners to ensure compliance with these conditions over the next
ten years. 98
The Attorney General believed this settlement would reduce Partners’
bargaining power in the market for a substantial number of years, while
providing the most benefit to the consumers. 99 This approach is less commonly
utilized, 100 but may become more popular as states and agencies look to
promote the goals of the ACA through care and data integration.
As part of her investigation, Coakley enlisted the services of the
Massachusetts Health Policy Commission (Commission or HPC) to research
the potential effects that would occur from this merger. 101 The Commission
93. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts Response to Public Comments at 3,
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14 2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Sept. 25, 2014). Note, the DOJ findings have not been released as of January 2016.
94. See generally Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment by Consent, Commonwealth of
Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Joint Motion for Consent Judgment].
95. Weisman & Allen, supra note 77.
96. See generally Joint Motion for Entry of Amended Final Judgment by Consent,
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Motion for Amended Judgment].
97. Id.
98. Id.; Joint Motion for Consent Judgment, supra note 94.
99. Joint Motion for Amended Judgment, supra note 96.
100. Brief for the Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae at 2, Commonwealth of Mass. v.
Partners HealthCare Sys., Inc., No. 14-2033-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2014).
101. HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.
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was established in 2012 to help control rising health care costs for consumers
in Massachusetts. 102 For 2014, the Commission established a benchmark of
3.6% for a sustainable rate of growth of health care expenditures, meaning that
such expenditures should not exceed that growth rate. 103 The Commission
undertook the task of analyzing whether the proposed merger between
Partners, South Shore, and Hallmark would actually benefit consumers or
whether it would force costs to exceed the benchmark. It wrote multiple reports
analyzing the proposed merger and settlement, all of which found critical
information lacking to support the parties’ assertions or found that the merger
would harm consumers. 104
For this review, the Commission looked at the stated goals of the merger
and all information provided by the parties that supported how and when the
merger would improve the market. 105 The Commission’s Hallmark Final
Report noted that Partners and Hallmark had the highest share of inpatient and
primary care services and Partners hospitals had higher prices than almost all
others in each region in which it operated. 106 Both Hallmark and Partners
hospitals generally met or exceeded quality benchmarks, though physician
groups for Hallmark met or were below the state average. 107 Most substantial
in the report, the Commission found that rather than reduce spending, the
proposed settlement would increase spending in northeast Massachusetts by
$15.5 to twenty-three million dollars each year. 108 The Commission
determined that this increase would not be offset by savings from reduced
utilization of services through population health management. 109 The
Commission noted that the merger would likely increase care access and
improve quality, but that the health system failed to provide critical
information to prove that these assertions would actually come to fruition. 110
In the Commission’s South Shore and Harbor Medical Final Report, it
reported very similar findings. It determined that medical spending would
actually increase twenty-three million dollars to twenty-six million dollars each
year because of increased physician prices and facility utilization. 111 Therefore,
the system would be able “to leverage higher prices and other favorable

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at Introduction.
Id.
Id. at 1-4.
Id. at Introduction.
HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
HEALTH POLICY COMM’N, REVIEW OF PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM’S PROPOSED
ACQUISITION OF SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL AND HARBOR MEDICAL ASSOCIATES 2 (2014)
[hereinafter HPC SOUTH SHORE REPORT].
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contract terms in negotiations with commercial [payors].” 112 Moreover, this
improved leverage is not included in the increased medical spending estimates
stated above. 113 Again, the Commission noted that while there would likely be
improvements in care delivery and health outcomes, Partners again did not
provide enough evidence to prove that increased costs would affect overall
quality performance at the South Shore facilities, where such performance is
already strong. 114 The Commission determined that these mergers would not
be an economically beneficial decision for consumers without additional
information explaining why integration is necessary to accomplish Partners’
goals. 115
In early 2015, the judge presiding over the case rejected the entire
settlement, finding that there was not enough evidence of pro-competitive
effects to counter the potential anti-competitive harm. 116 After receiving this
blow, Partners decided to withdraw its acquisition of South Shore Hospital,
although it planned to continue its acquisition of Hallmark Health Corp. 117
The Partners merger is a great example of the correlation between anticompetitive provider behavior and rising health care costs. It shows, through
all the empirical evidence analyzed and described by the Commission, how a
lack of regulation or insufficiently utilized, authoritative power over an
industry has the potential to elicit detrimental consequences on consumers.
Part of what makes the proposed Partners settlement offer so unique is its
attempt to regulate the system by applying conditions to be met, known as
conduct remedies, 118 instead of rejecting the merger or requiring some
structural change. There are two types of remedies commonly employed to
regulate the massive health care industry—structural remedies, which include
divestiture of assets, and conduct remedies, which include obligations or
changing conduct. 119 However, neither remedy has been able to adequately
control the overall cost escalation in the industry.
Structural remedies are often preferred over conduct remedies because they
are more effective at eliminating the anti-competitive concern in most mergers,

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2-3.
116. Priyanka McCluskey & Robert Weisman, Partners’ Deal to Acquire Three Hospitals
Rejected, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/29/part
ners/s9TxpYCBakjPN6pDbBFHGL/story.html.
117. Press Release, Mass. Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG Healey Statement on Partners
Decision to Withdraw Intent to Acquire South Shore Hospital (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.mass.
gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2015/2015-02-17-ag-stmt-partners-withdraw.html.
118. Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 4-7.
119. Id. at 4; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER 9: REMEDIES 149 (2008), www.justice.gov/sites/de
fault/files/atr/legacy/2008/09/12/236681_chapter9.pdf.
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but the health care industry has so many additional forces influencing it that
these remedies have limited effect. 120 In other industries, such remedies may
be more effective, but the nature of health care is one of continual need. People
will never stop needing the services offered, so the providers have an innate
power that allots them great control. This power gives them the ability to
determine base prices, negotiate with private and public payors, and increase
costs virtually whenever they choose. Because of this paradox, rate regulations
may be more influential than structural or conduct remedies as the ACA takes
effect.
One of the most important effects anti-competitive mergers have on
consumers is the rise in health care costs. To understand the way these mergers
affect consumer costs, it is crucial to understand how health care organizations
charge patients. Most notably, hospitals use a system known as the
chargemaster, which allows them to negotiate compensation with payors. 121 A
chargemaster is essentially a master list of hospital services, items, and
procedures and their associated fees. 122
When hospitals first started using chargemasters in the 1930s, all
consumers were charged the same rate, which was originally calculated at the
cost of providing the service plus ten percent, regardless of insurance.123
However, when Medicare was created, it required a differentiation between
actual cost and charges, wherein Medicare paid only the cost, while all other
consumers paid charges (service cost plus hospital charges). 124 Then when
managed care took over the market, insurers negotiated reduced rates for their
beneficiaries. 125 These changes eventually led to the chargemaster system in
place today, which has little to no relation to the actual costs of items and
procedures incurred by the hospitals. 126
Medicare continues to pay hospitals a flat rate, which it determines based
on an evaluation of a multitude of diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) for each
hospital. 127 However, many hospitals say the Medicare rates do not cover the
full expenses undertaken by a hospital, and, thus, force the hospital to operate
at a loss for those patients. 128
In markets where a health care system controls a majority of hospitals and
physician groups, there are generally higher prices for services and products

120. Id.; Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 4.
121. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11,
16-24 (2014).
122. Id. at 16.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Brown, supra note 121, at 17.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id. at 24.
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offered at those facilities. 129 Having the majority of market power, or even a
large part of it, enables hospitals to set prices for their chargemaster at higher
rates because there is less competition. 130 This has become more evident in
some areas, like Boston, where one or two hospital chains dominate a majority
of the market and have commanded higher prices from insurers and employers,
with little to prevent them from continuing in this pattern. 131 The great
variance in pricing is evidence that the health care system needs additional
regulation for consideration of anti-competitive behaviors.
Adding to the problem, each insurance company negotiates different rates
with each hospital it contracts with as a provider, 132 so consumers may not
always expect to receive the same rate for the same service at any of the innetwork facilities. Consumers with insurance coverage pay only a small
percentage of the actual chargemaster list price. 133 However, for those
consumers without insurance or for those who use an out-of-network provider,
with whom their insurance company has no contract, the consumer may be
forced to pay the full list price, 134 a daunting prospect to anyone. Even more
concerning, the arranged prices between insurers and hospitals are considered
confidential, 135 so price competition is difficult to implement.
This very issue was brought to public light in 1996 when Partners and
BlueCross BlueShield of Massachusetts allegedly came to an arrangement
regarding price setting for physician services at a significantly higher rate than
before. 136 This agreement allegedly promised that BlueCross BlueShield would
give Partners’ physicians the biggest insurance payment in exchange for
Partners’ requiring all other insurers to offer equal or higher payments, thus
making BlueCross the most competitive offer though significantly more
expensive than before. 137 Though neither party will admit to this exact deal,
the sudden rate increase that occurred shortly after suggests evidence of its
truth. 138 While the public will likely never know officially, a less dramatic
version of this is far too common. Insurers negotiate rates with hospitals all the

129. Elisabeth Rosenthal, As Hospital Prices Soar, a Stitch Tops $500, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/health/as-hospital-costs-soar-single-stitch-tops500.html_?r=0.
130. See id.
131. Id.; see Weisman & Allen, supra note 77.
132. Brown, supra note 121, at 21-22.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 129; Brill, supra note 19.
135. Brown, supra note 121, at 22.
136. Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, BOS.
GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2008), http://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/handshake-that-madehealthcare-history/QiWbywqb8olJsA3IZ11o1H/story.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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time, but consumers are not privy to those conversations or the terms to which
they are agreed, 139 and are thus unable to control their own costs.
Moreover, this system punishes those with the least bargaining power—
those who are also the least likely to be able to afford the extraordinary
charges. 140 Patients who seek hospital services and are not covered by a
government-sponsored program or insurance may expect to pay a markup of
1,400% or more for a simple test. 141 This concept of variable rates for different
payors is known as price discrimination, and it is completely legal. 142 Hospitals
justify this price disparity by explaining that the lost profits from Medicare,
Medicaid, or unpaid debts of self-payors require them to make up the
difference by charging more to others—a cost-sharing rationale similar to that
used by insurance companies—called the cost-shifting theory. 143
Health economists seem to view this cost-shifting theory promoted by
hospitals to rationalize price discrimination with skepticism. 144 In their own
studies, some economists found that the reason for higher costs was more
likely due to a hospital’s market power, not its need to make up for
government-payor shortfalls. 145 They also noted that when paid by Medicare,
hospitals often cut their own costs or output, thus eliminating the need to offset
expenses to other consumers. 146 The fact that these negotiations continue to
exist between hospitals and insurers demonstrates the lack of rate regulations
that govern these relationships in regards to appropriate payments. Each
hospital offers different prices based on whatever factors they believe are

139. Brown, supra note 121, at 22.
140. Id.
141. See generally id.; Brill, supra note 19. Patient was charged $199.50 for Troponin test
when Medicare would have paid the hospital $13.94 for that test. Id. This exemplifies the cost
valuation that Medicare has deemed appropriate for that service for the hospital including
overhead costs, regional differences, and other factors. Id.
142. Brown, supra note 121, at 24.
143. Uwe Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory of
Cost Shifting: Is It Time for A More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2125-26
(2011).
144. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89
MILBANK Q. 90, 90-91 (2011); Chapin White, Contrary to Cost-Shift Theory, Lower Medicare
Hospital Rates for Impatient Care Lead to Lower Private Payment Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF. 935,
941-42 (2013).
145. See Frakt, supra note 144; see ROBERT MURRAY & SUZANNE F. DELBANCO, PROVIDER
MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: ASSESSING ITS IMPACT AND LOOKING
AHEAD 15-16 (2012).
146. See David Dranove et al., How Do Hospitals Respond to Negative Financial Shocks?
The Impact of the 2008 Stock Market Crash 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18853, 2013). But see James Robinson, Hospitals Respond To Medicare Payment Shortfalls
By Both Shifting Costs And Cutting Them, Based On Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1265, 1269-70 (2011) (concluding that hospitals may cut costs, although some may shift costs,
depending on location or market).
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important and there is no national or state standard that hospitals must follow
to determine these prices. 147
B.

Medical Device Industry Case Study and Anti-Competitive Effects

There are other factors that play into the rates set by hospitals, primarily
the increasing cost of medical devices, drugs, and equipment, which
themselves are controlled by the same market power concept of hospitals and
health care groups. For instance, one of the most common surgical procedures
in America today is joint replacement. 148 The price for these procedures varies
from hospital to hospital, as the chargemaster prices are determined on an
individual hospital basis. 149
As an example, for one man, a hip replacement in the U.S. was estimated
to cost $78,000 plus other fees, with $13,000 of that being the actual device. 150
That steep price for a replacement joint was the “list price” with no markup,
essentially the price the hospital paid for the device. 151 Due to the high cost of
the repair in the U.S., the man opted to get the joint replaced in Belgium,
where he paid $13,660 including surgery, device, therapy, and airfare. 152 This
anecdote shows not only the great discrepancy in health care treatment costs,
but also the discrepancy of the medical equipment costs between the U.S. and
other developed nations. 153
Even though there are thousands of medical device companies worldwide,
many of the markets are controlled by a select few. For instance, despite there
being about 6,500 medical device companies in the U.S., ninety-one percent of
the joint replacement market is controlled by six companies in the U.S. 154 The
global medical device industry is also dominated by U.S. companies, which

147. Brill, supra note 19. There is “no process, no rationale, behind the core document that is
the basis for hundreds of billions of dollars in health care bills.” Id.
148. Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Need of a New Hip, but Priced out of the US, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/health/for-medical-tourists-simple-math.html?_
r=0 [hereinafter Hip]; see also Brown, supra note 121, at 12.
149. Hip, supra note 148.
150. Id. One estimate found that a manufacturer spends about $350 to make a single hip joint,
but price markups lead to these devices being sold for thousands of dollars. Id. (estimating the
price for actual manufacturing cost, not including other factors like R&D); see also Asha S.
Geire, Comment, Price Wars and Patent Law: Reducing the Cost of Health Care Through
Medical Device Price Transparency, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 246 (2009) (noting
artificial knees can cost over $10,000 and a single spinal screw can cost $1,600 in the U.S.).
151. Hip, supra note 148.
152. Id.
153. Geire, supra note 150 (“[f]or example, Europeans pay about 25% of what Americans pay
for artificial hips”).
154. ORTHOWORLD, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS INTO THE ORTHOPEDIC INDUSTRY 1-2 (2012),
https://www.orthoworld.com/index.php/fileproc/index/knowentADJADJorthoknowADJADJ2012
ADJADJorthoknow1206LXLXLXpdf.
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hold thirty-eight percent of the entire industry market as of 2012. 155 These
companies have managed to limit or avoid many regulations through their
extensive lobbying of Congress, 156 though they have experienced some
pushback from the DOJ relating to kickback schemes. 157
The medical device companies often manage to undercut the industry and
prevent generics and foreign-made products from entering the market largely
through trade policy, patents, and an expensive FDA process that discourages
potential start-ups. 158 While trying to prevent foreign countries from exporting
devices to the U.S., these companies expect the U.S. government to negotiate
with other countries to reduce barriers for U.S. products. 159
Additionally, health care organizations that buy the products have
surprisingly little bargaining power, much like the uninsured do against
hospitals, because there are so few options and products are not bought in
bulk. 160 The parallel between hospitals and the medical device manufacturing
industry versus consumers and hospitals is ironically clear. Both of these
relationships exemplify the effects of strong market power, lack of
competition, and lack of rate regulation. Unfortunately, the ultimate loser of
both battles is the consumer, who will likely bear the large brunt of the costs
that pass on to them.
V. ADDITIONAL ANTITRUST CONSEQUENCES AND CONCERNS
Despite the general antitrust laws that help monitor and prohibit anticompetitive business practices before they happen, there is also a huge
problem of what happens to consumers after mergers are allowed. Specifically,
once hospitals merge and create massive health systems, do those governing
agencies actually protect consumers from price-gouging? Once hospitals have
taken over a large part of the market, there is little that can be done to reduce
costs to consumers. 161 Even if the hospital systems have “passed the tests” of

155. SELECT USA, supra note 61.
156. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., supra note 63.
157. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Device Company
Smith & Nephew Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/medical-device-company-smith-nephew-re
solves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation; Press Release, U.S. Attorney Dist. of N.J.,
Wright Medical Technology, Inc. Agrees to Corporate Compliance Reforms and Monitor
Oversight to Address Alleged Violations of Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2010/Wright%20Medical%20Complaint,%20
DPA%20PR.pdf.
158. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 13.
159. Id.
160. See Rosenthal, supra note 129.
161. To demonstrate this problem, the amicus brief filed in the Partners case noted a
prominent FTC case from 2000. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 5. There, Evanston
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competitive effect, they may still conduct unfair consumer practices in the way
they charge for services, treatments, and general care. 162 This is one of the
biggest reasons health care today is so expensive in the U.S. 163
A.

Partners’ Settlement Concerns

The scenario described above is also a potential reason the Attorney
General in Massachusetts may have proposed a settlement with Partners—as
an effort to control rate-hikes for the following five to ten years. However, the
biggest complaint by opposition against this settlement was the concern for
what happens when this time constraint runs out. The settlement offered no
permanent solutions that would effectuate long-term change for the health care
system. While potentially beneficial for the next five to ten years, after that
deadline, Partners would be free to increase rates to whatever it chooses,
though it would likely remain within the allotted benchmark for medical
expenditures. This means that Partners’ hospitals could and would likely
increase the chargemaster prices that are determined for services and
equipment offered by the hospital. Furthermore, Partners would be very
capable of demanding higher insurance payments for physicians within its
system because it would have such a dominant market share within the area. 164
Without the merger, Partners had a twenty-eight percent share of the entire
Massachusetts market, but with the merger, this number would certainly
increase. 165 In fact, using data from the Center for Health Information and
Analysis (CHIA) and the HPC, the merger would give Partners roughly a fifty
percent market share within metro Boston, a fifty percent share within South
Shore, and a forty-seven percent and thirty-five percent share in North Boston
and West Boston, respectively. 166 Even with the restrictions the settlement
would place on Partners limiting further expansion for the next five to ten
Northwestern Healthcare was able to acquire Highland Park hospital with no structural or conduct
remedies. Id. Shortly after, inpatient prices increased by fifty percent to payors, significantly
greater than others in the area. Id. There were no noticeable quality improvements either. Id. The
merger was found anti-competitive in 2005 and affirmed by the FTC in 2007, but at that point,
too much integration had occurred, and it was impossible to force divestiture of the hospital. Id.
The FTC issued an independent contract negotiating team for the Highland hospital but this team
was never utilized because its usefulness would be minimal. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 5.
162. Id.
163. Brill, supra note 19.
164. See Dafny et al., supra note 90, at 6-7. When a similar conduct remedy was offered to a
merging health care system in Grand Rapids, Michigan in 1996, the prices increased twelve
percent when the remedy terms expired in 2004. Id. These rates continued to exceed the consumer
price index for years following the terms’ expiration. Id.
165. See CHIA REPORT, supra note 81, at 6.
166. See Weisman & Allen, supra note 77 (these figures were determined by adding the
market share controlled by Partners to the market share of South Shore and Hallmark, as the
graph indicates on the article).
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years, it is virtually impossible that any other health care system in the area
would have a comparable market share in that time. Every other health care
system in the area would have to merge into one system to match that kind of
market share. This type of merger almost certainly would be rejected by the
attorney general, the FTC, or the DOJ because of the clear anti-competitive
effect it would have in creating a two-player market where a multi-player
market previously existed.
B.

Medical Device Competition Concerns

For medical devices, the competition issues for consumers are somewhat
different. Unlike hospitals and physician groups, which seem always to be on
the search for their next merger, the big medical device companies are not
necessarily interested in merging with one another to take over a specific
region. Some smaller device companies merge with similar-sized and larger
companies, and some companies seek mergers abroad. 167 However, these
companies are more concerned with excluding their overseas competition from
U.S. sales than they are concerned about competition within them. 168 In an
article published in April 2014, two attorneys discuss this problem in terms of
antitrust concerns and intellectual property laws. 169 The attorneys determined
that the medical device companies are not acting anti-competitively because
there is no real evidence that they are colluding with each other to raise
prices. 170 However, this view overlooks another aspect of antitrust that is very
relevant to the antitrust discussion. While hospitals are trying to create super
systems to gain market share, these large technology companies are trying to
keep smaller and foreign competition, which may offer devices at a
significantly lower price, out of the market. 171 The device companies likely
would prefer to have a larger share of their respective market, but are equally
interested in making sure foreign companies do not get a share. Further
motivating the domestic device companies to control the market, development
of non-U.S. medical device manufacturing has begun to cut into the
profitability and global market power of the U.S. companies. 172
The way in which medical device companies control the market is by
spending millions of dollars lobbying in Washington D.C. to control

167. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 8-9.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Roger D. Blair et al., Patents, Monopoly Pricing, and Antitrust in Health Care Markets,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2014, at 1, 2.
170. Id. at 5.
171. See generally INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62.
172. Compare SELECT USA, supra note 61, with INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., supra note 62, at 4.
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regulations that apply to them and their would-be competitors. 173 Most
recently, the medical device industry lobbied hard against a condition written
into the ACA that requires a 2.3% tax on the sale of their products. 174 These
lobbying efforts seem to have paid off, at least for the next two years. 175 The
legislative fight began in the form of a House bill to repeal the tax, a bill that
was supported by both republican and democratic members from the states in
which the medical device companies are located. 176 In December 2015, both
the House and Senate approved a suspension of the tax for two years as part of
the congressional spending bill. 177
The medical device companies argued that such a tax would be detrimental
to their R&D programs and hinder job growth, and alleged that the tax would
ultimately fall on the consumer to pay. 178 However, this argument fails to
recognize that only about six percent of the industry’s earnings are actually
reinvested into R&D for their products. 179 In fact, the Congressional Research
Service released its findings on the tax effects in November 2014 and noted
that the tax will not likely harm the device companies’ profits, and “estimate[d]
that it will reduce industry output and employment by no more than .2
percent.” 180 Whether or not the tax would actually harm these companies is
debatable and only determinable with time, but the consumers would almost
certainly draw the short end of the stick, as so often occurs in health care.
Furthermore, the risk of repeal has significantly greater repercussions; if
other industries that are disgruntled with ACA monetary provisions see the
medical device tax successfully repealed, they too may try to repeal applicable
provisions, putting up to $370 billion at risk. 181 The medical device tax alone
was expected to garner thirty billion dollars over the next ten years, money that
was already earmarked for funding other projects. 182 The statistics and facts
seem to indicate that if these companies charge more, it is not because they

173. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., supra note 63. Over thirty-two million dollars were
spent on lobbying by the industry. Id.
174. Id. (note in charts, the dollars lobbied in 2012-2014 and the states that received the most
lobbying support—same as the states with large medical device manufacturing industries); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 4191(a) (2012).
175. Kristina Peterson, Congress Passes $1.15 Trillion Spending Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-1-15-trillion-spending-bill-1450450381.
176. Daniel, supra note 64.
177. Id.; Peterson, supra note 175.
178. Daniel, supra note 64.
179. Geire, supra note 150, at 248.
180. Daniel, supra note 64 (finding the “domestic revenues for medical technology firms
grew 4 percent to $336 billion in 2013, the first year the tax went into effect – about the same rate
from 2012, indicating that the industry seems financially stable for now” with the tax in effect).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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must do so in order to recover losses from manufacturing and development, but
perhaps simply because there is no regulation to prevent them from doing so.
VI. RATE REGULATION AND COMPETITION GOING FORWARD
A.

Health Care Industry

When looking to potential solutions, it is important to remember that there
are many hurdles to overcome before most changes can be implemented.
Likewise, it often takes a significant amount of time before any changes have a
noticeable effect. For instance, realistically, Medicare takes months and
sometimes years to change because the process of proposing, commenting on,
and finalizing rules requires extensive time. So even if changes are made to the
current regulations or laws, like the passage of the Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act (MACRA) in April 2015, 183 the effects will take time to
develop. Despite this delay, as the ACA begins to have a stronger effect on the
overall health care market, solutions are needed to enable its goals and protect
consumers. There are, as previously mentioned, options for agencies and
attorneys general to use structural and conduct remedies to monitor care
mergers.
For the Partners case study described in detail in Part IV.A, the HPC
suggested that the Attorney General and the court make the proposed
settlement conditions permanent instead of temporary. 184 This way, the
extremely powerful Partners system would have been unable to further expand
its market control or price out the rest of its competitors permanently. Had the
settlement been approved, the DOJ and FTC could have assessed how Partners
and its remaining competitors handled the limitations for the next five to ten
years. The agencies could have used those results as an opportunity to see
whether conduct or structural remedies are truly more effective in the long run.
Because the settlement was thrown out, it is difficult to speculate on the
potential outcome of the deal. But, similar settlement offers may develop in the
future and provide agencies with an opportunity to assess such outcomes.
When the ACA was passed, it included a transparency rule that required all
hospitals to make their chargemaster lists publicly available or to publicly
disclose how to obtain the information on the lists. 185 However, it has been a
struggle to get participation by hospitals. To further enforce this mandate,
CMS posted a reminder to hospitals to comply with this condition in its

183. See generally Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11410, 129 Stat. 87 (2015).
184. See HPC HALLMARK REPORT, supra note 83.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(e) (2012); Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/research-statis
tics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/medicare-provider-charge-data/.
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proposed rules from May 2014 and reiterated this point in its final rule as
well. 186 CMS believes that this pricing transparency will enable patients to be
better informed and make smarter financial decisions with health care, while
making hospitals more accountable for their prices. 187
To better encourage hospitals to comply with this requirement, CMS could
implement a penalty system for noncompliant hospitals in the form of
Medicare reimbursement restrictions or monetary penalties imposed on the
hospital itself. Some states have also taken a role in this initiative and have
passed their own legislation that requires hospitals to post their prices for
services. 188 The posting of chargemasters is a step in the right direction for
price transparency, but it is limited in effect. Posting chargemaster lists will not
guarantee consumers a designated price because each doctor uses different
tools, products, and methods to administer a service to patients. Doctors are
loyal to different medical device manufacturing companies, which all charge
different rates for their products. 189 What consumers need most is a publicly
available set price for a service, one that would be the same across the board
for all patients. 190 Excluding the public availability of information, this is
roughly how insurance plans, Medicare, and Medicaid function, and it has
been fairly successful for them.
Additionally, insurers are in the unique position to determine exactly
which facilities and doctors they will cover and where geographically they will
offer coverage. Because of this, insurers could take advantage of medical care
options abroad by extending coverage to certain facilities and doctors that are
certified by an organization for offering approved quality care. 191 One of the
biggest hurdles that these insurers would face is beneficiary concern over
foreign standards of care. When this approach was attempted in 2006 in North
Carolina and West Virginia, it was rejected because people were hesitant about
outsourcing medical care. 192 More education on the available resources abroad
may help ease this concern as might the ever-rising medical costs in the U.S.

186. Section M Requirement for Transparency of Hospital Charges Under the ACA, 79 Fed.
Reg. 27,978, 28,169 (proposed May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 405, 412, 413, 415,
422, 424, 485, and 488).
187. Id.
188. Transparency and Disclosure of Health Costs and Provider Payments: State Actions,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/transparencyand-disclosure-health-costs.aspx; Christopher Weaver, Want To Know What A Hospital Charges?
Good Luck, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 29, 2010), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/hospitalprices/.
189. See Hip, supra note 148.
190. See Weaver, supra note 188.
191. Rebecca Bennie, Medical Tourism: A Look at How Medical Outsourcing Can Reshape
Health Care, 49 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 583, 585-86 (2014).
192. Id. at 586.
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As prices rise, people may be more willing to consider foreign options if
they are certified by an organization and covered by their insurance. As the
high prices of American health care continue to climb and influence people’s
medical decisions, more insurers may begin to consider this option. This
concept of “medical tourism” offers many positive benefits but is not without
its problems. In order for this type of program to be safe and effective,
beneficiaries will likely need assurance that their health information is kept
private, in other words, that the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) extends to foreign providers. 193
There also needs to be a malpractice agreement that gives some power to
the beneficiary through a court or arbitration proceeding in case of
negligence. 194 These are just a sample of the concerns regarding medical
tourism, but, if resolved, Americans and their insurers are likely to experience
savings of forty to ninety percent compared to what they would pay for
domestic care. 195
An alternative, more favorable solution has been the recent trend of
employers and insurers to offer domestic medical tourism to beneficiaries
willing to travel to another state for care. 196 The benefit to domestic medical
tourism is the guarantee of quality, privacy, and legal rights, in addition to
saving money. 197 This trend has seen great success by the companies that have
implemented it in their insurance policies. 198 Patients and insurers will not see
as great of savings with this option compared to foreign medical tourism, but
the greater assurance of quality care may make this option more viable. This
domestic tourism could cause medical service prices to increase in the more
competitively priced markets being used, but it could also influence other
markets to lower their prices to match those prices offered elsewhere. As the
domestic medical tourism movement strengthens, it could inadvertently create
self-regulation within the health care industry.

193. Id. at 598.
194. Id.
195. Lee Ann Eissler & John Casken, Seeking Health Care Through International Medical
Tourism, 45 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP, 177, 177 (2013); see M.Z. BOOKMAN & K.R. BOOKMAN,
MEDICAL TOURISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 50 (2007).
196. John Graham, How Domestic Medical Tourism Could Save Us All Money, WASH. POST
(Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-medical-tourism-could-save-usall-money/2015/02/06/e8e2be28-ad55-11e4-abe8-e1ef60ca26de_story.html; Samuel S. Choy &
Stacey L. Stewart, Domestic Medical Tourism Gaining Traction, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (July
2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/
aba_health_law_esource_1107_choy.html.
197. Graham, supra note 196; Choy & Stewart, supra note 196.
198. See Choy & Stewart, supra note 196.
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Medical Device Industry

It would be unfair to say that agencies have done nothing to control
medical technology companies’ antitrust behavior. As mentioned previously,
the DOJ investigates these companies often under the False Claims Act and
sometimes finds sufficient evidence of illegal kickbacks to physicians by
companies encouraging physician use of their products. 199 However, the
parties often settle before a final judgment can be made, so the companies are
typically only punished monetarily. 200 Furthermore, when the DOJ settles with
these companies, they are not forced to admit any wrongdoing, thus the
companies avoid harsher penalties that may have more influential effects. 201
As such, financial disincentives from the government do not seem to be
effective enough to change the way these companies conduct business. This is
evident by the recovery of $14.2 billion—more than half the total recovery
from all False Claims Act cases since 2009—by the DOJ from fraud cases
involving federal health care programs. 202 In addition to regulatory difficulties,
the lobbying stronghold of the medical device industry also poses a great
challenge to overcome when seeking governmental action.
Given these challenges, the best method of controlling the rising prices
may be in the hands of the parties with whom the companies contract. For
instance, CMS contracts with these medical device companies to provide
payment for the products used by government-sponsored beneficiaries. 203
Because CMS sets a low threshold for payment, the government could use this
threshold as a baseline benchmark and restrict pricing above a certain
percentage of that for all negotiating parties, including private and self-payors.
This would likely be a fair representation of value since CMS uses a variety of
data to determine the actual cost of the products. 204 This government-induced
199. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-Based St. Jude Medical Pays U.S. $16
Million to Settle Claims that Company Paid Kickbacks to Physicians (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minnesota-based-st-jude-medical-pays-us-16-million-settle-claimscompany-paid-kickbacks [hereinafter Minnesota St. Jude Press Release]; Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Manufacturer of Spinal Devices and Surgeon to Pay United States $2.6 Million to Settle
Alleged Kickback Scheme (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/manufacturer-spinaldevices-and-surgeon-pay-united-states-26-million-settle-alleged-kickback [hereinafter Medical
Devices Press Release].
200. Minnesota St. Jude Press Release, supra note 199; Medical Devices Press Release, supra
note 199.
201. See Minnesota St. Jude Press Release, supra note 199; See Medical Devices Press
Release, supra note 199.
202. See Medical Devices Press Release, supra note 199.
203. Fact Sheets: CMS Proposed Changes Regarding Durable Medical Equipment,
Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies for CY 2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(July 2, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Factsheets-items/2014-07-02.html.
204. Brown, supra note 121, at 19-20.
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rate regulation on medical device makers has the potential to be the most
effective means of controlling the market prices of the products because the
government has the capability to create the regulation and monitor its
effectiveness. However, such a government regulation may be unlikely to
succeed, especially with the powerful lobbying group the industry has
cultivated.
A more likely alternative could be to encourage the insurers and physicians
with whom these companies contract to implement a more limited bidding
process. For example, a doctor who tried this approach managed to
successfully reduce his cost for a product by thirty percent by using a blind
bidding process directly with the manufacturers and choosing only to use one
of two types of implants. 205 Taken on a larger scale, this type of blind bidding
process with limited options could be effective in driving down these costs for
insurers. The insurance companies are required to cover certain treatment
options according to the ACA and their contracts with beneficiaries, 206 but
they could use a stricter form of blind bidding with limited options to
discourage the medical device companies from maximizing rates.
For medical device competition control, there could also be amendments to
current intellectual property laws, specifically patent protections. However,
patent law is beyond the scope of this article, and, as such, will not be
discussed in detail. Such changes would likely be the responsibility of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) through stricter regulation management.
The FDA also plays a role in the management of antitrust problems in this
industry as well as the management of unnecessary medical expenses. The
FDA is the agency that governs medical equipment companies’ devices and the
marketability of the devices. 207 An interesting aspect of the FDA is that it does
not consider price when approving a new device for the market. 208 Its only
requirement for permissibility is that the device is effective in the ways in
which it claims to be, and such effectiveness is sufficiently supported through
scientific evidence. 209 Because of this, one way to control the prices of medical
devices is for the FDA to implement a cost analysis in its approval process of
new devices. This way, the market would not be inundated with variations of
one product, all with new legal protections and high prices attached. The FDA
could take many different steps to control these device companies through

205. Hip, supra note 148.
206. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§1301-1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18001
(2012); see also What Marketplace Health Insurance Plans Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
207. Overview of Device Regulation, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDe
vices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ (last updated Aug. 14, 2015).
208. Geire, supra note 150, at 255.
209. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(a)(3)(B), 360(a)-(e) (2012)).
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patent monitoring in conjunction with the PTO. However, as previously noted,
patent law is not within the scope of this article.
The federal government or a state government could try an approach
similar to that of Belgium’s national health care system. In the case study of
the man with the joint replacement, he was able to have such affordable
treatment because Belgium has a required insurance policy for all citizens and
has enacted regulations on hospitals and physicians regarding how much they
can be reimbursed for services. 210 This policy extends to the medical device
market as well. 211 Patients can expect a set fee for a service that is negotiated
with the government on an annual basis. 212 Physicians are dis-incentivized
from charging more than the government negotiated price because patients
know they can seek treatment from a more affordable source. 213 Such an
approach is very unlikely given the political state of the U.S., but it could make
a great example for states to use as a guide or suggestion when considering
how best to control health care costs within their own borders.
VII. CONCLUSION
The health care industry in the U.S. is wrought with obstacles for
consumers to overcome. Access to quality care is important for all, but it often
comes at a high price, especially in markets with less provider competition. In
these markets, understanding the economic principles that led to monopolistic
health care can help people find solutions to make care more affordable. The
lack of regulations governing health care rates and the difficulty in enforcing
existing regulations has put this country’s consumers at a disadvantage. From
the medical device companies that have taken over the market in the past few
years to the hospitals that use the products and assign pricing, the consequence
of ineffective regulation and reduced competition is apparent in the health care
expense statistics.
The overall health care industry’s cost to consumers is rising at an
unsustainable rate. People simply cannot afford to allocate half of their income
towards health care in the future, a very real possibility if significant changes
do not occur. 214 Consumers need regulations from government agencies to help
control the rising costs of medical services. They also need better access to

210. Hip, supra note 148.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Geire, supra note 150, at 241 (citing PAUL B. GINSBURG, HIGH AND RISING HEALTH
CARE COSTS: DEMYSTIFYING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING, RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT
NO. 16 1, 5 (2008)) (suggesting that forty-nine percent of U.S. gross domestic product could be
spent on health care by 2082).
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information so they can be well-informed consumers and make medical
decisions that are financially smart.
In order to empower people to take control of their health care, providers
within the industry need incentives—positive or negative. In the medical
device industry, a stronger concerted effort may be needed from federal and
state governments, physicians, hospitals, and private insurers to force lower
prices. Similarly, it may take a stronger pushback from public consumers,
private insurers, and government to force health care providers with large
market power to lower prices, have transparency in costs, and establish set
prices for services.
Security in health is one of most important needs of the well-known
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, second only to food and shelter. 215 Americans
need to feel secure in their ability to access and afford quality health care.
Therefore, it is imperative for the industry to change to meet the needs of the
consumers, on whom the industry is dependent in order to be successful.
Instead of looking at health care as consumer reliance on the industry for a
service, providers must realize that pricing out the consumers will ultimately
cycle back to hurt the providers’ businesses. Change is necessary to have a
sustainable health care future for this country.
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According to Maslow’s theory, “health” falls under the category of “Safety Needs,” which is
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